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SECURITIES REGULATION
George Lee Flint, Jr.*

ECURITIES regulation deals primarily with the laws preventing
and providing remedies for fraud in the sale of stocks and bonds.
Although this Article includes Fifth Circuit cases under federal law,
the author has attempted to limit the material to that involving state law1
and only briefly touches federal securities law. 2 The author does not intend this Article to be an exhaustive survey of securities regulation, but
rather an update regarding developments of interest to the Texas based
securities practitioner.
I.

COVERAGE OF THE SECURITIES ACTS

The definitions, especially those relating to the issues of what constitutes a security, who may recover, and the territorial reach, determine the
scope of the securities acts. The Fifth Circuit issued one decision con-3
cerning standing to sue under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.
The decision narrows who may recover under the federal act for false
registration statements. This group of potential plaintiffs is even narrower under the Texas Securities Act ("TSA") since it has a privity
4
provision.
In Krim v. PCOrder.com,5 the Fifth Circuit had an opportunity to cut
back the number of "after-market" investors that could bring a lawsuit
under section 11 of the Securities Act of 19336 for misstatements and
omissions in a registration statement. The Fifth Circuit had previously
* H. Andy Professor of Commercial Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San
Antonio, Texas; B.A., 1966, B.S., 1966, M.A., 1968, University of Texas at Austin; Nuc. E.,
1969, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Ph.D. (Physics), 1973, J.D., 1975, University
of Texas at Austin.
1. Texas has two major statutes to combat securities fraud: the Texas Securities Act
[hereinafter TSA] and the Texas Stock Fraud Act [hereinafter TSFA]. See TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 581 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (TSA); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01
(Vernon 2002) (TSFA).
2. Since the Texas Legislature based portions of the TSA on the federal securities
statutes and Texas courts rely on federal decisions to interpret the corresponding sections
of the TSA, this Article also examines federal developments in the Fifth Circuit. See TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. to 1977 Amendment (Vernon Supp. 2004).
3. See Krim v. PCOrder.com, 402 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2005).
4. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1997) ("any person acquiring such security") with TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33A(1) ("the person buying the security from him") and
Comments on Specific Sections ("§ 33A(1) ... is a privity provision") (Vernon Supp.
2004).
5. Krim, 402 F.3d at 489 (from the Western District of Texas).
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1997).
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determined that "any person acquiring such security" issued under the
erroneous registration statement included purchasers in the after-market,
provided that they could trace their shares back to shares sold under the
registration statement. 7 Krim dealt with the traceability of shares purchased in the after-market in street name. 8 Street-name shares are listed
on the issuer's shareholder list in the name of the nominee for a depository. That certificate includes all the shares held in street name by the
numerous brokerage houses using that depository so that transfers in
street name between clients of two brokerage houses using the same depository need not require new certificates. 9
Krim involved two sorts of lead plaintiffs. One sort purchased their
shares at a time when the street name certificate included only shares
purchased in the initial public offering under the registration statement. 10
The district court found these traceable. When there is only one offering into the public market and it is through the registration statement, all
stock necessarily traces to the faulty registration statement. 12 Nevertheless, the district court dismissed the lawsuit as to the first sort since the
13
issuer had offered them a settlement equal to their potential recovery.
The second sort purchased their shares at a time when the street-name
certificate included a few shares (0.15%) from insiders selling after the
initial public offering. 14 The plaintiff investors used binomial probability
to show that the odds that at least one share held by the second sort came
from the initial public offering was very nearly 100%, much greater than
the 51% presumedly required by the preponderance-of-the-evidence
rule. The district court, nevertheless, found these shares not traceable
and dismissed the lawsuit. 15 The investors challenged this second dismissal, but the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 16 The chosen method of statistical
tracing would result in each share purchased in the after-market conferring standing to sue despite language in section 11 limiting the lawsuit to
"any person acquiring such security. ' 17 This would be the case whenever
more than 50% of the available shares were issued under the defective
registration statement or whenever sufficient additional shares were purchased while the registration statement shares number less than 50%.18
7. See Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 873 (5th Cir. 2003), see also George
L. Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 57 SMU L. REV. 1207, 1238-39 (2004) (discussing
Rosenzweig).
8. Krim, 402 F.3d at 492.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. This is the Rosenzweig situation. See Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 873.
13. Krim, 402 F.3d at 493.
14. Id. at 492.
15. Id. at 492-93.
16. Id. at 491.
17. Id. at 496-97.
18. For the calculations, see Krim, 402 F.3d at 496 n.36 (showing that a purchase of 35
shares would be sufficient when the registration statement shares are only 2% of the outstanding shares in the public market).
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The Fifth Circuit also refused to broaden the standing to bring a section
11 lawsuit due to changed circumstances, namely the development of
widespread holding of securities in street name in the 1960s, a practice
uncommon in the 1930s when Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933,
leaving such revision to Congress. The Fifth Circuit noted that other
courts had rejected similar attempts to broaden section 11 standing using
tracing 19 or the fungible-mass method of tracing whereby the purchaser is
deemed to own a pro20 rata portion of the shares purchased under the registration statement.
ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE SECURITIES BOARD
The TSA created a regulatory body, the State Securities Board
("Board") to handle the registrations required by those laws, as well as to
serve as an enforcement mechanism.
The Board amended its form for public information charges and billing
detail to reflect current fees for public information established by the
Texas Building and Procurement Commission in accordance with the
persons requesting
Public Information Act 21 and to accurately 2apprise
2
public information of the associated charges.
II.

III.

REGISTRATION OF SECURITIES

The basic rule of most securities laws is that securities either need to be
registered with the regulatory agency or fall within an exemption to registration. The Board reconsidered two of its exemptions from registration.
The Board adopted new rules reorganizing the exemption for sales to
23
financial institutions and certain institutional investors under the TSA.
The investment advisor portion of the exemption corresponds to a new
federal Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") registration exemption. 24 The Board rule, however, does not parallel the federal rule.
The Board feels that entities composed partially or entirely of natural
persons are not institutions, and private investment entities similarly
composed are not institutional investors. Consequently, the Board's defi19. See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 271-72 (2d Cir. 1967).
20. See Krim, 402 F.3d at 499; Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 F. Supp. 1375, 1381 (D. Minn.
1984), affd 760 F.2d 272 (8th Cir. 1985) (table case).
21. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 552 (Vernon 2004).
22. 30 Tex. Reg. 3990 (2005), adopted 30 Tex. Reg. 1383 (2005) (to be codified as an
amendment to 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 133.2) (without comment) (amending 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 133.2) (without comment).
23. 30 Tex. Reg. 3987 (2005) (to be codified as an amendment to 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 109.3) (confining the rule to sales to savings institutions and deleting the portions moved
to new rules at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 109.4-.6); 30 Tex. Reg. 3987 (2005) (to be codified
as an amendment to 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 109.4 (registration of the securities), 109.5
(registration of the dealers), & 109.6 (registration of the investment advisors)); 30 Tex.
Reg. 1383 (2005) (proposed Mar. 11, 2005). See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5H
(Vernon 2004) (providing an exemption for sales to banks, savings banks, insurance companies and the like).
24. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1(d) (2005) (defining "private fund" for the definition
of client of an investment adviser).
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nition of private fund does not exclude those funds allowing natural persons to redeem within two years of purchase for extraordinary events as
does the federal rule. The Board also amended its rule concerning sales
to accredited investors to clarify the requirement that an issuer reasona25
bly believes the purchases are made with investment intent.
The Board has taken numerous enforcement actions 26 against issuers
who did not register their securities, 27 many involving the internet. 28 Sev25. 30 Tex. Reg. 3990 (2005), adopted 30 Tex. Reg. 1389 (2005) (to be codified as an
amendment to 7 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 139.16) (without comment).
26. The Board's top ten list of threats to Texas investors includes (1) Ponzi schemes,
(2) unlicensed securities sellers, (3) unregistered investment products, (4) promissory notes
issued by those unable to deliver promised returns, (5) fraudulent or unsuitable opportunities targeted toward senior citizens, (6) high-yield investments, (7) internet fraud, (8) affinity fraud, (9) variable annuity sales practices, and (10) oil and gas scams. See, e.g., Meena
Thiruvengadam, Scammers Drillingfor Oil Investors, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Apr.
7, 2005, at 1E.
27. See In re Provision Interactive Tech., Inc., No. ENF-05-CDO/FIN 1589, 2005 WL
1421388, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June 7, 2005) (agreed cease and desist order to California company for selling unregistered limited partnership interests through unregistered
dealer without registration of the securities); In re In Touch Parents, Inc., No. ENF-05CDO-1585, 2005 WL 584973, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 10, 2005) (emergency cease and
desist order to Nevada company for selling unregistered founders stock through unregistered dealers without registration of the securities and without disclosing a Wisconsin Order of Prohibition against one selling dealer for sales of stock in another company); In re
Revelle Res., Inc., No. ENF-05-CDO/FIN-1583, 2005 WL 513366, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd.
Mar. 1, 2005) (agreed cease and desist order for selling unregistered working interests in an
Illinois oil well without registration as a dealer and ordering an administrative fine of
$500); In re Cornerstone Ministries Invs., Inc., No. ENF-05-CDO/FIN-1592, 2005 WL
389682 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 14, 2005) (agreed cease and desist order for selling unregistered common stock and bonds with material misrepresentations in SEC filings of a listing
on the Chicago Stock Exchange; claiming in state Board filings an unawareness of major
adverse business developments when the Chicago Stock Exchange denied a listing since
the issuer did not meet the minimum requirements and indicated that future applications
would likely be denied; and claiming in the prospectus that no legal proceedings were
pending despite Michigan having given notice to show compliance for various misleading
statements and ordering a $20,000 administrative fine).
28. See In re Fat Franks Chicago Style Hot Dogs LLC, No. ENF-05CDO-1593, 2005
WL 2416039, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 27, 2005) (emergency cease and desist order to
company selling unregistered investment programs; one program split profits after bills
were paid from profits at all locations and another program invested in iceberg harvesting,
renewable forestry, and pen ocean fish farming through the internet without registering as
a dealer and without disclosing a $58,000 default judgment against one principal, the risks
of the investments, and financial information); In re Frank Torres Castillo, No. ENF-05CDO-1594, 2005 WL 2416040, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 27, 2005) (emergency cease and
desist order to Mexican real-estate-investment trust selling limited liability company shares
through the internet without registering as a dealer and without disclosing the risks of the
investment, thus rendering the return figure of 73% over 5 years misleading); In re Tyche
Global Investors, Inc., No. ENF-05-CDO 1590, 2005 WL 1695943, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd.
July 14, 2005) (agreed cease and desist order to company for selling unregistered moneymarket mutual fund interests offering a return of 13% through the internet without registering as a dealer); In re Aransas Oil Co., Inc., No. ENF-05-CDO-1588, 2005 WL 1387561,
at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 31, 2005) (emergency cease and desist order to company selling
unregistered working interests in oil and gas leases for Texas land without registering as
dealers); In re Pureinvestor.com Inc., No. ENF-05-CDO-1587, 2005 WL 858205, at *1-2
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Apr. 6, 2005) (emergency cease and desist order to company selling
unregistered interests in a 5-year trust plan through the internet without disclosing financial data, the principals, information needed to compute a return, and the risks; misleading
the public by describing the investment as licensed when not registered and the company

Securities Regulation

2006]

1545

eral involved a challenge to an emergency cease and desist order, 29 and
one involving taped telephone offers made over the Board's undercover
30
telephone line.
IV.

REGISTRATION OF MARKET OPERATORS

One of the underpinnings of state regulation of securities is the requirement to register as a seller of securities before selling securities in
the state and as an investment advisor before rendering investment advice.3 1 Registration infractions generally surface when applying or reapplying for registration.

A.

DEALERS

The Board amended its rules concerning both dealer and agent examinations 32 and investment advisor representative examinations 33 to provide an examination waiver for an applicant whose prior Texas
registration has lapsed for more than two years, but who has continuously
been registered with the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD") and the state securities regulator of the state where the applicant maintains its principal place of business.
The Board has had numerous enforcement actions against selling
agents and dealers. Dealer infractions included failure to have a regisas incorporated when not registered to do business in Texas, all without registering as dealers); In re ATM Alliance Corp., No. ENF-05-CDO-1586, 2005 WL 656156, at *1-2 (Tex. St.
Sec. Bd. Mar. 17, 2005) (emergency cease and desist order to company selling unregistered
passive interests in an ATM-terminal business through the internet without disclosing
bankruptcies of principals, financial information, risks, and the failure rate of other such
businesses; misleading the public by claiming 12 years experience for a company formed 1
year ago, all without registering as dealers).
29. See In re Complete Estate Serv. LLC, No. 312-05-4069, 2005 WL 1995574, at *1-3
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 15, 2005) (confirming cease and desist order against investment
program guaranteeing annual return of 10% for 5 years and 13.2% for 10 years through the
internet without disclosing the identities of the principals, their financials and past records,
and the risks of the investment until the securities are registered and the dealers are registered), afTg in part In re Tri-Forex Int'l, Ltd., No. ENF-05-CDO-1581, 2005 WL 236650
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Jan. 25, 2005); see also In re Lyle Energy Group, Inc., No. 312-05-4097,
2005 WL 704329, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 23, 2005) (affirming emergency cease and
desist order when issuer failed to appear at requested hearing), affg, No. ENF-04-CDO1579, 2004 WL 2980010 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 13, 2004).
30. See In re Dunwell Corp., No. 312-05-0553, 2005 WL 1713074, at *4, *7 (Tex. St.
Sec. Bd. July 19, 2005) (confirming cease and desist order against company selling oil and
gas working interests in Alabama well without disclosing the minimum needed to initiate
the program and orally misrepresenting an 8 to 1 return contained in sales literature as a 35
to 1 return), affg, No. ENF-04-000-1569, 2004 WL 1925428 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 20,
2004).
31.

See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-13 (Vernon Supp. 2004).

32. 30 Tex. Reg. 3988 (2005), adopted 30 Tex. Reg. 1385 (2005) (to be codified as an
amendment to 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 115.3) (without comment).

33. 30 Tex. Reg. 3989 (2005), adopted 30 Tex. Reg. 1386 (2005) (to be codified as an
amendment to 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 116.3) (without comment).
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tered qualified designated officer, 34 required by the rules, 35 material misrepresentations to the Texas Securities Commissioner in connection with
information required to determine a dealer's qualifications, 36 selling unregistered securities without registering as a dealer,37 and inequitable
34. See In re Omega Research Corp., No. IC05-FIN-20, 2005 WL 1986002, at *2 (Tex.
St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 11, 2005) (ordering an administrative fine of $1,450 for failing to file for
registration of new designated officer within 30 days of resignation of old officer and failing
to respond to Board requests to do so a year later); In re Dealer Registration of Aegis
Capital Corp., No. IC05-CAF,-17, 2005 WL 1327365, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June 2, 2005)
(ordering an administrative fine of $3,500 for failing to file for registration of new designated officer within 30 days of old officer becoming a non-control person, and failing to
respond to two Board requests to do so 2ih years later); In re Dealer Registration of Great
E. Sec., Inc., No. IC05-CAF-12, 2005 WL 1068602, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 4, 2005)
(reprimanding and ordering an undertaking to appoint a new designated officer and an
administrative fine of $4,000 for failing to file for registration of new designated officer
within 30 days of removal as a control person of old designated officer and failing to respond to two Board requests to so do 3 years later); In re Dealer Registration of Scudder
Investor Servs., Inc., No. IC05-CAF-11, 2005 WL 985189, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Apr. 22,
2005) (reprimanding and ordering an undertaking to file information on new designated
officer and an administrative fine of $700 for failing to file for registration of new designated officer within 30 days of registration termination of old designated officer and failing
to respond to two Board requests to so); In re Dealer Registration of Stuart Sec., Inc., No.
IC05-CAF-09, 2005 WL 740126, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 29, 2005) (reprimanding and
ordering an undertaking to file information on new designated officer and an administrative fine of $900 for failing to file for registration of new designated officer within 30 days
of termination of old designated officer and failing to respond to two Board requests to do
so); In re Dealer Registration of Zahorik Co., Inc., No. IC05-CAF-08, 2005 WL 641328, at
*1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 16, 2005) (reprimanding and ordering an undertaking to file
information on new designated officer and an administrative fine of $250 for failing to file
for registration of new designated officer within 30 days of termination of old designated
officer); In re Dealer Registration of C.E. Unterberg, Towbin, LLC, No. IC05-CAF-05,
2005 WL 494434, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 28, 2005) (reprimanding and ordering an
undertaking to file information on new designated officer and an administrative fine of
$1,500 for failing to file for registration of new designated officer within 30 days of termination of old designated officer); In re Dealer Registrations of Benfield Advisory Inc., No.
IC05-CAF-03, 2005 WL 389683, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 14, 2005) (reprimanding and
ordering an undertaking to file information on changes in designated officer and an administrative fine of $1,450 for failing to file change information within 30 days of registration
termination of old designated officer and failing to respond to three Board requests to so).
35. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 115.2(b) (2004).
36. See In re Dealer Registration of Flexvest Sec. Group, Inc., No. IC05-CAF-16, 2005
WL 1328164, at *3-4 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 27, 2005) (reprimanding, suspending for 120
days, ordering an administrative fine of $10,000, and ordering compliance with an undertaking to implement procedures to insure maintenance of new account information, not to
create a pool of investor funds for 2 years, and to notify the Commissioner within 120 days
of creating any such fund, all for representing to the NASD, the SEC, and the Commissioner that new account forms were complete when they were not, selling unregistered
hedge fund interests, using an unregistered selling agent, and failing to update filed information concerning another selling agent).
37. See In re William Erik Byrne, No. ENF-05-CDO-1584, 2005 WL 584972, at *1-2
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 10, 2005) (agreed cease and desist order to unregistered dealer who
sold unregistered corporate promissory notes and unregistered variable annuity policies
not filed with the Texas Department of Insurance and gave compensated investment advice
while unregistered); In re Applications for the Agent and Inv. Adviser Representative Registrations of Russell Kent Childs, No. IC05-SUS-01, 2005 WL 80292, at *3 (Tex. St. Sec.
Bd. Jan. 3, 2005) (granting registration, reprimanding the agent, suspending the agent for
15 days plus tolling periods of nonregistration, and ordering a $50,000 administrative fine
for selling numerous unregistered limited partnership units while registered with another
entity).
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practices in the sale of unregistered securities. 38 Selling-agent violations
involved unsuitable recommendations 39 and failing to properly disclose a
felony offense.

40

B.

INVESTMENT ADVISERS

The Board amended its rule concerning supervision of investment advisors by clarifying that supervisory systems must be in writing and registered investment advisors must be informed of their supervisory
systems.

41

The Board had several enforcement actions against investment advisers. These actions primarily involved rendering compensated service af43
42
ter registration lapsed and before renewal or without registration.
38. See In re Dealer Registration of LH Ross & Co., Inc., No. 04-IC02, 2005 WL
389684, at *2-3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 14, 2005) (default order revoking dealer registration
for selling the dealer's unregistered preferred stock by representing the dealer was going
public when it had taken no steps to go public and representing that a 6% quarterly dividend would be paid when the dealer had no intention of resuming dividends; violating
suitability requirements by selling to investors not understanding the illiquid nature of the
securities and providing the private placement after the sale; violating the dealer's written
procedures to supervise its agents by accepting new accounts without the signature of the
designated principal, using an unlicensed principal, failing to review suitability profiles, and
failing to sign subscription agreements).
39. See In re Agent Registration of Stafford Fabian Lucky, No. IC05-SUS-15, 2005 WL
1244572, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 24, 2005) (reprimanding, suspending for 31 days plus
tolling periods of nonregistration for recommending to a Texas investor to take out a home
equity loan and invest the proceeds in two mutual funds, unsuitable based on the investor's
disclosed financial position and needs); In re Agent Registration of Alfonso Roberto
Asencio, No. IC05-SUS-07, 2005 WL 627979, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 13, 2005)
(granting registration, reprimanding, suspending for 50 days plus tolling periods of nonregistration, and ordering an undertaking to cooperate with investigation by the Board and
NASD, all for recommending to a Texas investor excessive use of margin).
40. See In re Agent & Inv. Adviser Representative Registrations of Brian Christopher
MacMaster, No. IC06-CAF-14, 2005 WL 1244571, at *2-3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 20, 2005)
(reprimanding, ordering an administrative fine of $4,000, and ordering an undertaking to
properly disclose the felony conviction and an administrative action on the agent's next
registration, to withdraw the agent's current registration, and not to file a registration for
24 months; all for describing a 10-year-old guilty plea for possession of cocaine as "taking
the rap" for others' possession in the car that the agent was driving and as "final" when
misrepresentations about it was the reason for denial of an application to the Texas Department of Insurance the year before).
41. 30 Tex. Reg. 3989 (2005), adopted 30 Tex. Reg. 1387 (2005) (to be codified as an
amendment to 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 116.10) (without comment).

42. See In re Investment Adviser Registration of Teakwood Fin. Advisors, Inc., No.
IC05-CAF-06, 2005 WL 575514, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 8, 2005) (reprimanding and
ordering administrative fines totaling $2,000 for rendering compensated investment advice
in a five-month gap between registrations as an investment advisor).
43. See In re Applications for Inv. Adviser Registration of BAMC Inv. Mgmt., Inc.,
No. IC05-CAF-26, 2005 WL 2406949, at *2-3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 22, 2005) (granting
application while reprimanding and ordering administrative fines totaling $12,000 for giving compensated advice without registration); In re Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Dallas Leigh Jones, No. IC05-CAF-23, 2005 WL 2405222, at *2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd.
Sept. 16, 2005) (reprimanding and ordering administrative fine of $4,000 for giving compensated advice on behalf of his employer without registration); In re Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Maco Stewart Fowlkes, No. IC05-CAF-24, 2005 WL 2405223, at
*2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 16, 2005) (same, but fine of $10,000); In re Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Jay Wallace Branson, No. IC05-CAF-25, 2005 WL 2405224, at *2
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One involved misleading advertising, an inequitable practice, 44 and the
use of prohibited testimonials. 45 Another involved the failure to report a
changed address, discovered when the Board attempted an inspection at
46
the old address.
V.

SECURITIES FRAUD

One of the major reasons legislatures passed securities acts was to facilitate investors's actions to recover their moneys through a simplified
fraud action that removed the most difficult elements to prove in a common-law fraud action, namely scienter and privity.

A.

COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE TEXAS

AcTS

The Texas Supreme Court reversed two courts of appeals decisions,
one dealing with the misrepresentation required for a fraud action involving the sale of a quitclaim deed and the other expounding on the scienter
requirement for aider and abetter liability. 47 Additionally, one appellate
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 16, 2005) (same, and granting the application); In re Applications
for the Inv. Adviser Registration of Kaizen Mgmt., LP, No. IC05-SUS-22, 2005 WL
2277081, at *2-3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 15, 2005) (granting registration, reprimanding,
suspending the registration for 15 days plus tolling periods of nonregistration, and ordering
administrative fines totaling $20,000 for rendering compensated advice without registration); In re Inv. Adviser Registration of David Lee Borders, No. IC05-SUS-19, 2005 WL
1874439, at *2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 4, 2005) (granting registration, reprimanding, suspending the registration for 60 days, and ordering administrative fine of $2,000 for rendering compensated advice for 3 years without registration); In re Applications for the Inv.
Adviser Registration of Bond Fund Res. Mgmt., L.P., No. IC05-CAF-13, 2005 WL
1123353, at *3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 10, 2005) (reprimanding, ordering administrative
fines totaling $2,700, and ordering an undertaking not to render investment advice until
registered for providing compensated investment advice); In re Inv. Advisor Registration
of Hawthorn Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. IC05-CAF-10, 2005 WL 858206, at *2 (Tex. St. Sec.
Bd. Apr. 11, 2005) (reprimanding, ordering an administrative fine of $2,500, and ordering
an undertaking to hire an outside compliance specialist if not registered for a two-year
period); In re Tarpon Capital Mgmt., L.P., No. IC05-CAF-02, 2005 WL 236649, at *3 (Tex.
St. Sec. Bd. Jan. 25, 2005) (granting one investment advisor representative application,
reprimanding the two investment advisor representatives, and ordering an administrative
fine against the investment advisor in the amount of $80,000 for numerous compensated
investment advice without registration).
44. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-14A(3) (Vernon 2004) (providing remedies for inequitable practices).
45. See In re Investment Adviser Registration of Ryan Edward Parker, No. IC05-SUS21, 2005 WL 1986003, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 15, 2005) (reprimanding, suspending
registration for 10 days plus tolling periods of nonregistration, and ordering administrative
fine of $7,000 for using testimonials and creating the appearance that a major financial
publication had published an article about the investment adviser's website when it had
not); see also 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 116.15(1)(a) (2006) (prohibiting testimonials in advertising by investment advisers and investment adviser representatives).
46. See In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Michael David Scott, No. IC05-CAF-18,
2005 WL 1414351, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June 14, 2005) (reprimanding and ordering
administrative fine of $2,500 for delaying 7 months to report a changed address); see also 7
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 116.9(a)(6) (2006) (requiring report of changed information previously disclosed to the Board within 30 days).
47. Geodyne Energy Income Prod. P'ship I-E v. Newton Corp., 161 S.W.3d 482 (Tex.
2005) (misrepresentations under the TSA); Sterling Trust Co. v. Adderley, 168 S.W.3d 835
(Tex. 2005) (scienter for aider or abaiter liability).
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court's decision involved the evidence needed to show rescission damages
48
under the TSA and Texas Stock Fraud Act ("TSFA").
1. Misrepresentationunder the TSA
In Geodyne Energy Income Production PartnershipI-E v. Newton Corporation, the Texas Supreme Court determined that a sale at an auction
by a quitclaim deed of a 10% working interest in an oil and gas lease did
not violate the TSA. 49 The operator had sued the nonoperators for their
portion of the cost of plugging a non-producing well.50 The issue was
whether the purchaser or the seller of the interest would pay the $72,000
cost of plugging the well. Since the purchase of the interest involved a
security, 51 the purchaser sought to escape the plugging-cost liability by
obtaining rescission of the $300 sale under the TSA, which allows an action against a seller who sells a security by means of an untrue statement
of a material fact or failing to state a material fact. The only alleged misrepresentation was the identification of the property in the auction catalog as a "GWI.10000000," a gross working interest, from which the
52
purchaser assumed a valid lease.
The lease had expired by its terms the year before the auction since
production had dwindled below paying quantities and reworking operations had not commenced within the sixty-day period called for in the
lease. The operator, however, neglected to inform the nonoperating interests of the expiration until after the auction. 53 The appellate court
supported the jury finding of an omission 54 from the failure to supply the
purchaser with billing statements indicating that the operator had performed no reworking operations. 55 The Texas Supreme Court dismissed
this argument since the same information appeared in other documents
supplied to the purchaser. 5 6 The Texas Supreme Court then determined
that the securities in this oil and gas lease could be sold by a quitclaim
deed, noting that this was a traditional method of transferring such interests in the oil and gas industry and that the legislature had expressed that
48. Reardon v. Light Path Techs., Inc., 183 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (rescission damages).
49. Geodyne Energy, 161 S.W.3d at 484.
50. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 89.011 (operator liability), 89.012 (nonoperator
liability), & 89.081 (cause of action for portion) (Vernon 2001).
51. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4A (Vernon Supp. 2004).
52. Geodyne Energy, 161 S.W.3d at 486.
53. Geodyne Energy Income Prod. P'ship I-E v. Newton Corp., 97 S.W.3d 779, 782
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2003), rev'd in part, 161 S.W.3d 482 (Tex. 2005).
54. See Geodyne Energy, 97 S.W.3d at 787; see also George L. Flint, Jr., Securities
Regulation, 57 SMU L. REv. 1207, 1230-31 (2004) (discussing Geodyne Energy). The court
of appeals focused on the causation/reliance elements of the fraud action, a matter the
Supreme Court did not reach since it found no misrepresentation or omission.
55. See Geodyne Energy, 97 S.W.3d at 787.
56. Appellate courts only report facts sufficient to support their opinions. See, e.g.,
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BusH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 35 (Oceana Publications, Inc. 1960) (1930). The court of appeals never mentioned the fact that disclosure
was made in other documentation that the Texas Supreme Court determined dispositive of
the case.
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one of the purposes of the TSA was to encourage capital formation and
minimize regulatory burdens, especially for small businesses. 57
As for the misrepresentation claim, the Texas Supreme Court found no
misrepresentation as a result of the quitclaim deed.5 8 The purchaser got
title to a ten-percent interest, albeit in liabilities rather than assets. 59 A
quitclaim deed contains no representation concerning title, in the absence
of prior representations amounting to fraudulent inducement, accident,
or mistake. 60 The manner of conducting the auction (limiting the bidders
to those warranting their substantial experience and investments in the
oil and gas industry and obtaining purchaser signatures to a buyer's conditions of sale that contained explanations that the seller was making no
representations as to any warranties of title, merchantability, or fitness
for purpose, that the buyer needed to conduct its own verification of information, and that the buyer acknowledged a review and understanding
of the conveyancing documents) defeated any assumption that the auction listing represented the lease's validity. 61 The buyer's admission of
reviewing files showing virtually no production for the well and the auctioneer's announcement that the well had no production destroyed any
assumption concerning the lease's validity. Consequently, the Texas Supreme Court reversed and rendered that the buyer take nothing on its
62
TSA claim against the seller.
2.

Scienter for Aider-Abbetter Liability under the TSA
In Sterling Trust Co. v. Adderley,63 the Texas Supreme Court outlined

the scienter requirement for aiding and abetting liability under the TSA 64
and explained how it differs from the corresponding provision of the Uniform Securities Act adopted in some other states. 65 In Sterling Trust, an
investment advisor and broker operated an illegal Ponzi scheme by con57. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-10-1(B) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (added in
1983; "This Act may be construed and implemented to effectuate its general purposes to
protect investors and consistent with that purpose, to encourage capital formation, job formation, and free and competitive securities markets and to minimize regulatory burdens
on issuers and persons subject to this Act, especially small businesses."). This language
appears in the section relating to registration with the Board and not in the private remedies section; however, there is another analogous provision for registration. See infra note
35.
58. Geodyne Energy, 161 S.W.3d at 490.

59. Id.
60. See Commercial Bank, Unincorporated v. Satterwhite, 413 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Tex.
1967) (attempted real-estate-deed reformation disallowed in absence of fraud, accident, or
mistake); Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. 1988) (Deceptive Trade Practices
Act action not barred if deed contradicted earnest money-contract).
61. Geodyne Energy, 161 S.W.3d at 490-91.
62. Id. at 491.
63. 168 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2005). The courts did consider one other aider and abettor
case during the Survey period; however, the court only had the opportunity to consider
jurisdictional issues under the long-arm statute. See IRA Res., Inc. v. Griego, 161 S.W.3d
248 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, no pet. h.).
64. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
65. UNIF. SECURITmS Acr § 410(b), 7C U.L.A. 266 (1956); see, e.g.,
LAWS ANN. ch. 110A, § 410(b) (West 2005).

MASS. GEN.
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vincing elderly investors to invest their retirement savings in companies
that the investment advisor owned. Maintaining the favored tax status of
the retirement funds required a third-party trustee to hold the funds. After the SEC shut down the Ponzi scheme, rendering the investors' investments worthless, the investors sued the third-party trustee as an aider and
abettor. The investors provided evidence that the third-party trustee (1)
was aware that the perpetrator of the fraud commingled investors' funds
by allowing one entity pay on debt of another entity, and (2) failed to
follow its own internal policies by holding defaulted promissory notes,
failing to obtain stock certificates, original promissory notes, and copies
of security agreements, and allowing the perpetrator of the fraud to direct
new investments without investor approval. The jury found the thirdparty trustee liable as an aider and abettor.66 The trial court awarded $6
million in actual damages, which the appellate court affirmed. 67 The
third-party trustee presented two errors of the appellate court: (1) failure
to include in the jury instruction the requirement of a general awareness
of the aider and abettor's role in the securities law violation, 68 and (2)
failure to permit the aider and abettor a due-diligence defense. 69 The
Texas Supreme Court found the first point an error and reversed and
70
remanded, but it did not find the second point an error.
For the first point, the Texas Supreme Court focused on irrelevant language in the TSA that specifically authorizes, but does not mandate, construction of the statute to coordinate with federal law when dealing with
registrations and exemptions under the TSA. 71 This language, however,
omits any mention of its application to the civil actions such as the fraud
action in question. This approach also overlooks the long-standing procedure of Texas courts to use federal decisions interpreting those parts of
the TSA that are extremely similar in language to the federal acts, but not
where there are differences, 72 such as with the fraud action in question.
66. Sterling Trust, 168 S.W.3d at 837-39.
67. See Sterling Trust Co. v. Adderley, 119 S.W.3d 312, 316, 325 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2003), rev'd in part, 168 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2005). See also Flint, supra note 54, at
1210-11 (discussing Sterling Trust). The jury also found the third-party trustee liable for
breach of fiduciary duty, which the appellate court affirmed and the Supreme Court reversed for defective jury instructions.
68. On this point the Fort Worth Court of Appeals differed from its fellow circuits.
See Goldstein v. Mortenson, 113 S.W.3d 769, 776 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.); Crescendo Inv., Inc. v. Brice, 61 S.W.3d 465, 472 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied);
Frank v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 11 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000,
pet. denied); see also Flint, supra note 54, at 1211 (discussing Goldstein).
69. Sterling Trust, 119 S.W.3d at 318.
70. Id. at 325.
71. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-10-1(A) (Vernon Supp. 2004) ("This act
may be construed and implemented to effectuate its general purpose to maximize coordination with federal and other states' law and administration, particularly with respect to (1)
procedure, reports, and forms; and (2) exemptions.").
72. Compare Searsy v. Commercial Trading Corp., 560 S.W.2d 637, 639-40 (Tex. 1978)
(using the federal Howie test to interpret "investment contract"); Campbell v. C.D. Payne
& Geldermann Sec. Inc., 894 S.W.2d 411, 417-18 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, writ denied)
(using the federal family-resemblance test to interpret "note"); Star Supply Co. v. Jones,
665 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ) (using the economic-reality
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The problem, of course, is that the federal securities statutes have no civil
liability provision regarding aiding and abetting. 73 The Texas Legislature
obtained its 1977 aider and abettor provision from the Uniform Securities
Act, a proposed model for state-law provisions. 74 Nevertheless, the Texas
Supreme Court seized upon erroneous pre-1977 federal common-law
75
cases imposing aiding and abetting liability under the SEC's Rule 10b-5
since those cases occurred before the 1977 Texas amendment and were
constructively known by the legislators. Those cases required a general
awareness on the part of the aider and abettor that its role was part of an
76
overall activity that is improper.
The Texas Supreme Court then addressed the language of the aiding
and abetting provision to confirm its conclusion. The investors contended
that the provision's "reckless disregard of the truth or the law" standard
did not require a subjective general awareness, but allowed liability for
the objective failure to investigate. 77 The Texas Supreme Court responded that this language in other contexts meant a subjective intent,
that the legislative intent was to impose a subjective scienter requirement, 78 and that the scholarly debate of the time suggested that imposing
the objective investigation, a lower negligence standard, would work too
great a burden on those engaging only in ordinary business activities such
as loaning money, managing corporations, preparing financial statements,
completing brokerage transactions, or, most importantly, rendering legal
advice. 79 Although the jury instruction contained the "reckless disregard" language, repeated arguments by the investors' attorneys at trial
that the third-party trustee exercised reckless disregard by ignoring its
own policies rendered the jury charge harmful error since the jury may
have thought that "reckless disregard" could be based on evidence of
mere negligence. 80
test for a sale of a business as "stock"); with Anheuser-Busch Cos. v. Summit Coffee Co.,

934 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no writ) (refusing a narrow federal interpretation for a misrepresentation in a sale since the TSA omits "by means of a prospectus or
oral communication").
73. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164, 179 (1994) (sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act and sections 9, 16, 18, and 20A of
the Exchange Act provide for no express aiding and abetting offense, so the Supreme
Court refused to imply one under Rule 10b-5); SEC v. Coffee, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir.
1974) (secondary securities liability as aider and abettor is borrowed from the common
law; the only statutory provision concerning secondary liability is the controlling-person
provision).
74. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. to 1977 Amendment (Vernon
Supp. 2004); see also UNIF. SECURITIES Acr § 410(b), 7C U.L.A. 266 (1956).

75. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
76. See, e.g., First Interstate Bank of Denver N.A. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 898 (10th Cir.
1992), rev'd, Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 179 (banning aider and abettor liability for
private actions under Rule 10b-5).
77. Sterling Trust, 168 S.W.3d at 841.
78. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. to 1977 Amendment (Vernon
2004).
79. Sterling Trust, 168 S.W.3d at 842.
80. Id. at 842-43.
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For the second point, the Texas Supreme Court noted that the legislature divided the perpetrators into three categories, each with a different
scienter requirement and hence different due-diligence defense.81 Investors need not show that sellers have scienter for a misrepresentation or
omission, but sellers have a defense that they did not know and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or omission.8 2 Investors similarly need not show that control persons, those directly or indirectly in control of the seller, have scienter, but control
persons also have a lack-of-knowledge defense albeit different from that
of sellers. Control persons must show that they did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the facts creating
liability.8 3 The TSA, however, differs from the Uniform Securities Act in
its treatment of aiders and abettors. The Uniform Securities Act treats
aiders and abettors the same as control persons, but limits the class of
aiders and abettors to employees, brokers, or agents. 84 The TSA broadens the class of aiders and abettors to any person who aids the sale, but
imposes a scienter requirement-the intent to deceive or reckless disregard for the truth or the law-that the investor must prove. This change
to the source for the Texas aider and abettor provision indicated that the
legislature considered scienter and lack-of-knowledge defense, and therefore, the Texas Supreme Court refused to alter that balance laid out in
the statute.
3.

Rescission Damages

In Reardon v. Lightpath Technologies, Inc.,85 the court dealt with investors who brought a fraud action under the TSA and TSFA against a technology company making optical glass for the telecommunications
industry. As preparation for an initial public offering ("IPO"), the company had a 1:5.5 reverse stock split coupled with a dividend offering of
class E shares to the pre-IPO shareholders. The class E shares were convertible into class A shares provided that the company achieved certain
milestones, otherwise they were redeemable for nominal value in 2000.
The IPO was successful, but the company failed to meet the milestones.
Upon the redemption of the class E shares, the investors brought suit for
rescission damages claiming that the company failed to disclose in the
proxy materials for the reverse stock split material facts that would have
shown the company was unlikely to meet the class E milestones. The trial
court granted summary judgment to the company, dismissing the action,
because the shareholders failed to produce evidence that they suffered
recoverable damages. 8 6
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 845.
See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33A(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
See UNIF. SECURITIES Acr § 410(b), 7C U.L.A. 266 (1956).

85. 183 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).

86. Id. at 429-30.
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The investors's evidence included a statement of post-IPO company
value contained in the proxy statement for the reverse stock-split, a statement in an officer's deposition confirming the investors' method of calculating damages, and expert-witness testimony on rescission damages. The
proxy statement claimed post-IPO market value of $33 million, but the
IPO infused only $8 million. The investors claimed the $25 million difference came from a $5 valuation of the class E shares. Unfortunately, the
proxy statement as a matter of law did not state a post-IPO value for the
class A or class E shares and merely recited the rights of the class E
shares, and stated that the class E shares were non-transferable, could not
be converted to class A shares unless certain milestones were met, and
87
were redeemable for nominal value in 2000 if not converted by then.
The court did not waver from this conclusion when considering the officer's conclusory testimony. The officer stated she had no recollection of
how the $33 million was calculated, although counsel, through leading
questions, obtained an affirmative answer to the investors' method of determining the $5 valuation. One expert calculated rescission damages as
the number of class E shares surrendered for redemption multiplied by
the price of the class A shares the day before. Another expert calculated
rescission damages by speculating on a renegotiation of the class E dividend, claiming that the investors would have gotten IPO warrants, then
proceeded to calculate the value of the warrants based on the price of the
class A shares the day before. The court rejected both methods as not
returning the investors to their position before the alleged fraud as is necessary for rescission damages. 8 8 Consequently, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the investors' damages, a necessary element of
their fraud cause of action, so the appellate court upheld the summary
judgment for the company. 9
B.

ARBITRATION UNDER THE TEXAS ACTS

Securities fraud is also a method for investors to reach their own brokers; however, these actions are usually subject to arbitration as provided
in their broker contracts. Since securities transactions are "transactions
involving commerce," the Federal Arbitration Act, rather than the Texas
Arbitration Act, applies. 90 Since 1989, the Supreme Court has permitted
arbitration of securities fraud actions under the federal act. 91 There were
several arbitrations against brokers conducted by the NASD involving
87. Id. at 436.
88. Id. at 442.
89. Id.
90. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1999); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon Supp.
2004); see, e.g., In re Mony Sec. Corp., 83 S.W.3d 279, 282 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2002, orig. proceeding).
91. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)
(under the Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987) (under the Exchange Act of 1934).
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the TSA and the TSFA. 92 Arbiters seldom explain their decisions as appellate courts do and need not follow the rules of law. 93 As a result,
investors also sue under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 94 Yet,
some trends are ascertainable.
Arbitrations almost invariably deal with investments that declined in
value-typically more than $200,000. Investor complaints involved
wrongful recommendations, 95 unauthorized trading, 96 mismanagement of
managed accounts, 97 and unsuitability. 98 Other reported actions did not
92. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 2002). For causes of action
under the Texas Acts, see Nelson S. Ebaugh & Grace D. O'Malley, From the Lone Star
State Picking Your Battles: A Guide to Selecting Causes of Action Under Texas Law to
Recover for Suitability Violations, 12 PUB. INV. ARB. BAR Ass'N BAR J. 43 (Spring 2005).
93. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435-37 (1952) (arbiters are not required to
explain their reasons; arbiters are reversed only for manifest disregard of the law).
94. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.50 (for sale of goods and services) &
17.506 (damages and defenses) (Vernon 2002) [hereinafter DPTA]. The DPTA's application to a transaction otherwise covered by the TSA is doubtful. See Portland Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Gov't Sec., Inc., 619 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1981, no writ) (securities are not goods because they are not tangible);
compare Allais v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, 532 F. Supp. 749, 751-52 (S.D. Tex. 1982)
(investment advice is not a service to a consumer due to coverage by the TSA with its duediligence defense), with Frizzell v. Cook, 790 S.W.2d 41, 43-45 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1990, writ denied) (investment advice is a service, but the due diligence defense of the TSA
is allowed); see generally Mark C. Watter, The Applicability of the Texas Deceptive Trade
PracticesAct to Securities Cases, 64 TEX. B.J. 542, 551 (2001) (Texas Supreme Court yet to
make a pronouncement, but such a decision is irrelevant to securities arbitrations where
arbiters routinely consider it); see E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Youngblood, 741 S.W.2d 363,
364 (Tex. 1987) (refusing to decide whether investment advice is a service).
95. For respondent dismissals, see Brown v. IMS Sec., Inc., No. 03-01611, 2005 WL
2333985, at *1 (N.A.S.D. Sept. 2, 2005) ($39,000 claim for amount paid in income tax for
recommending change of life insurance policies under the DPTA); Rhoden v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 04-00937, 2005 WL 1712090, at *1-2 (N.A.S.D.
July 4, 2005) ($50,000 claim for unsuitable purchases and recommendations, including disproportionate purchase of in-house Merrill Lynch products under the TSA, TSFA, and
DPTA).
96. For claimant recoveries, see Nugent v. Villalba, No. 01-04336, 2005 WL 1712112, at
*2, *4-5 (N.A.S.D. July 6, 2005) ($309,000 claim for excessive, unauthorized, and unsuitable
trading in investors' accounts under TSA, TSFA, and DTPA; awarded $309,000 with
$31,000 interest and $73,000 attorneys' fees). For respondent dismissals, see CardenasZavala v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., No. 03-05989, 2005 WL 1529492, at *1-2
(N.A.S.D. June 13, 2005) ($250,000 claim for unauthorized trading under DTPA; settled).
97. For claimant recoveries, see Gilliland v. Lorio, No. 03-05803, 2005 WL 1384735, at
*2, *4 (N.A.S.D. May 26, 2005) ($2,804,000 claim for purchasing unsuitable investments in
his managed account under the DPTA; awarded $289,000).
98. For claimant recoveries, see Andre v. Banc of Am. Inv. Servs., Inc., No. 04-01055,
2005 WL 770846 (N.A.S.D. Mar. 14, 2005) ($77,000 claim for purchasing variable annuity
and several aggressive growth mutual funds under TSA, TSFA, and DPTA; awarded
$27,000).
For respondent dismissals, see Margaret Jan Kemp IRA Rollover v. Morgan Stanley
DW, Inc., No. 04-04246, 2005 WL 1712114, at *1-2 (N.A.S.D. July 6, 2005) ($216,000 claim
for losses far exceeding properly balanced portfolio of 50% equities and 50% fixed income
for account of disabled elderly investor with unsophisticated guardians under TSA, TSFA,
and DPTA); Hall v. Sw. Sec., Inc., No. 03-04001, 2005 WL 1287088, at *1 (N.A.S.D. May
17, 2005) ($200,000 claim for concentrating life savings in a few speculative high-tech stocks
with little diversification under the TSA, TSFA, and DTPA); Hinderliter v. Citigroup
Global Mkts., Inc., No. 02-05812, 2005 WL 1249115, at *1 (N.A.S.D. May 5, 2005)
($3,000,000 claim for purchase of unsuitable stocks and variable annuity under TSA and
DPTA); Richard Dale Relyea Ltd. P'ship v. Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., No.
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specify the offense. 99
C.

COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL

ACTS

The fraud provisions of the TSA are modeled on the federal statutes. 10 0 As a result, Texas courts interpreting the TSA frequently look to
the federal decisions.
1. Pleading Misrepresentationand Scienter under the PSLRA
The Fifth Circuit considered three cases involving the pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") of
1995. Each of the three cases involved private securities fraud actions
under Rule 10b-5,10 1 which requires (1) a misstatement or omission, (2)
of a material fact, (3) in connection with a sale or purchase of a security,
(4) made with scienter, (5) on which the investor reasonably relied, and
(6) that proximately caused the investor's injury.' 02 The PSLRA requires
pleading for private securities-fraud actions under the federal statutes to
apprise each defendant as to their particular part in the fraud.10 3 The
PSLRA accomplishes this task by requiring the petition to specify: each
misleading statement; the reasons that the statement is misleading; if the
misstatement or omission is based on information and belief, the facts on
which the belief is formed; and facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the perpetrator acted with the required state of mind.' 0 4 The Federal
04-01092, 2005 WL 267604, at *1-2 (N.A.S.D. Jan. 20, 2005) ($3,346,000 claim for various
unsuitable high-yield bond purchases under TSA and TSFA).
99. For claimant recoveries, see George v. Prudential Equity Group, LLC, No. 0401128, 2005 WL 522031, at *1-3 (N.A.S.D. Feb. 4, 2005) ($650,000 claim under TSA and
TSFA; awarded $115,000). For respondent dismissals, see Allen v. Lindekugel, No. 0305402, 2005 WL 2170571, at *1-2 (N.A.S.D. Aug. 15, 2005) ($200,000 claim under TSA and
DTPA, settled); Baker v. AXA Advisors, LLC, No. 04-01513, 2005 WL 2044618, at *1-2
(N.A.S.D. Aug. 9, 2005) ($162,000 claim under TSA, TSFA, and DTPA, settled); Pounds v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., No. 04-01380, 2005 WL 1881411, at *1
(N.A.S.D. July 18, 2005) ($918,000 claim under TSA and DPTA, settled); Alexander v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., No. 03-04691, 2005 WL 1866009, at *1-2
(N.A.S.D. July 19, 2005) ($300,000 claim under TSA, TSFA, and DPTA, settled); Ware v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., No. 03-04490, 2005 WL 1712053, at *1-2
(N.A.S.D. June 30, 2005) ($500,000 claim under TSA and DTPA, settled); Beauregard Inv.,
L.P. v. Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, No. 03-05675, 2005 WL 1712056, at *1-2 (N.A.S.D.
June 28, 2005) ($656,000 claim under TSA, TSFA, and DTPA, settled); Mitchell v. Morgan
Stanley DW Inc., No. 04-00325, 2005 WL 1287101, at *1-2 (N.A.S.D. May 20, 2005) (unspecified claim under DTPA, settled); Bullard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., No. 99-04820, 2005 WL 1140249, at *1 (N.A.S.D. Apr. 25, 2005) ($200,000 claim under
DTPA, settled); Small v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 03-07664, 2005
WL 704177 (N.A.S.D. Mar. 9, 2005) ($337,000 claim under DPTA, settled); Flowers v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., No. 03-08425, 2005 WL 124131, at *1-2 (N.A.S.D. Jan. 7, 2005)
($490,000 claim under TSA, TSFA, and DPTA for mutual fund investments).
100. See supra note 2.
101. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
102. See Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 1994).
103. Defendants contributed to the author's early teaching career in the late 1980s by
hiring him to read securities fraud petitions to explain what they were being sued for. PrePSLRA petitions were so general as to provide few clues as to the misdeed.
104. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) - (2) (1997).
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Rules of Civil Procedure similarly require particular allegations of the
circumstances constituting the fraud, 10 5 which the Fifth Circuit has determined includes the time, place, and identity of the speaker of the misstatement.10 6 These pleading requirements as to misstatements and
scienter are regarded as difficult, designed to rid the court of time-consuming fishing expeditions using the federal discovery rules since the
PSLRA requires dismissal for pleading errors before discovery. 10 7 Consequently, when the Fifth Circuit began to find some pleadings sufficient
in these three cases, one commentator described the development as resulting from either the plaintiff's bar finally learning how to plead correctly or the Fifth Circuit's easing its requirements.' 0 8
In Barrie v. Intervoice-Brite,Inc.,109 the Fifth Circuit dealt with a NASDAQ issuer, a software company, that reported a successful 1999 merger,
cited impressive revenues, projected strong earnings, and then announced
it would report a loss and lower-than-projected revenues and earnings.
The resulting class-action lawsuit alleged misleading statements, based on
improper accounting methods contained in reports filed with the SEC,
press releases, and other corporate statements, relying on insider sales as
evidence of scienter. The district court dismissed the lawsuit as not meeting the pleading requirements of PSLRA. 110 The Fifth Circuit, however,
reversed in part and affirmed in part, finding that some misstatements did
satisfy the pleading requirements.1 1 '
With respect to the SEC reports, the issuer had recognized income during fiscal year 2000 when it shipped the software to a buyer before acceptance, delivery, and customization, rather than after acceptance by and
delivery to a buyer from which collectability is probable, as required by
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") for fiscal years
starting after 1997 and the SEC after 1999.112 When announcing the accounting-method change, the SEC stated that it would allow a one-time
cumulative adjustment for those improperly reporting. The issuer made
its $18-million adjustment in the first-quarter report for fiscal year 2001.
Consequently, the district court viewed the fiscal year 2000 financial
statements, signed by the issuer's chief executive officer, chief financial
officer, and a director and submitted in the issuer's annual report to the
SEC, as proper when made. Thus, the petition failed to explain why the
financial statements were false. 113 This conclusion, however, ignored the
105. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

106. See Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 177-78 (5th Cir. 1997).
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3) (1997).
108. See Anon, Another Plaintiff Meets PSLRA's Pleading Requirements, 23 Fletcher
Law Advisor No. 6 (June 2005), at 8-9.
109. 397 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2005) (from the Northern District of Texas).
110. Id. at 254.
111. Id. at 264.
112. See American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Statement of Position No.
97-2, Software Revenue Recognition; SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101, 64 Fed. Reg.
68,936 (Dec. 9, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211).
113. Barrie, 397 F.3d at 256-58.
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investors' identification of confidential witnesses who claimed the issuer's
chief financial officer knew about the alleged fraud, with one claiming
that he had submitted projections of revenues using the non-GAAP
method for fiscal year 2000 to that officer and that the officer used those
projections to decide whether to delay the one-time adjustment to the
following fiscal year, which the issuer did. Thus, this misstatement
14
survived.1
With respect to the press releases and other documents, the district
court properly dismissed most of the misstatements. As for the misstatement concerning an $8 million improper-revenue recognition on a
purchase order, the investors failed to identify any issuer official responsible for the misstatements. For most of the others, the Fifth Circuit accepted the issuer's explanation concerning the meaning of the statements
so that they were not misstatements. One, however, quoted the president
speaking of meeting financial goals. Since the financial targets involved
the fraudulent earnings, the statement was false.1 15 The president's scienter was supported by allegations concerning his bonus of 175% of his
salary for meeting those financial goals. A few other misstatements involved statements by one officer made in the presence of another, who
failed to correct the misstatement. The allegation failed to designate
which officer made the misstatement and which officer failed to correct
the misstatement.1 16 Although the Fifth Circuit does not accept the
group-pleading doctrine holding issuer officers liable for unattributed
corporate statements, 117 the Fifth Circuit found no reason to require a
designation of which officer made the statement and which officer failed
to correct the statement when only two are named. So these misstatements also survived. With respect to misstatements contained in analyst
reports, the investors failed to allege the facts needed for the conduit theory, namely, which issuer officer supplied the misinformation to the analyst, how the analyst received the information, and how the issuer officer
118
manipulated the information or analyst.
In R2 Investments LDC v. Phillips,119 the Fifth Circuit dealt with $300
million in notes issued in connection with a 1999 merger for which the
issuer was obligated to make a tender offer to repurchase $160 million of
the notes on January 2, 2001. The issuer made the tender offer on the
agreed date in the proper amount, giving the holders two months to
tender. At that time, the investor held about $6 million of the debt instruments. The following week, the issuer issued a press release announcing that it would not complete an anticipated acquisition, followed by a
114. Id. at 258.

115. Id. at 260.
116. Id. at 261.
117. See Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 365 (5th Cir.
2004); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 58 SMU L. REV. 1135, 1155
(2005) (discussing Southland Sec. Corp.).
118. See Southland, 365 F.3d at 373-74.
119. 401 F.3d 638 (5th Cir. 2005) (from the Northern District of Texas).
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report to the SEC of the acquisition agreement's termination and an announcement that financial projections were no longer an indication of
anticipated performance and that the issuer was reviewing its business
plan. The investor acquired more notes in the following month. Then the
issuer announced that it had agreed with other note holders that it would
only purchase $70 million notes in the tender. The investor refused to
agree with the reduction, and the issuer filed for bankruptcy. The investor brought a lawsuit for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5, controllingperson liability, and various state-law claims. The district court dismissed
the Rule 10b-5 claim, without which the controlling-person-liability claim
also failed, and refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
120
state-law claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
The alleged misstatements, contained in numerous SEC filings, concerned the obligation to repurchase the notes without disclosing that the
issuer lacked the cash to make the repurchase or was relying on risky
contingencies to provide the cash. The Fifth Circuit quickly concluded
that this omission lacked a logical connection to the statement made. Inability to complete the tender offer on time does not make the statement
that the issuer has an obligation misleading. 121 The petition also lacked a
strong inference of scienter, merely revealing that the issuer's officers
were aware of a cash shortage. The main evidence of scienter consisted
of a cash forecast showing insufficient cash, but clearly labeled a "worst
case" scenario, and an email concerning orders for cash transfers from
123
foreign subsidiaries. 1 22 The Fifth Circuit relied on its past decisions
that mere knowledge of an omission does not raise a strong inference of
scienter. Without allegations of a clear motive, the circumstantial evidence of scienter needs to be more than documents that merely indicate
an awareness of a cash-liquidity problem readily interpreted as an awareness of various contingency plans to solve the problem. 124 Other evidence of scienter concerned the chief financial officer's alleged
knowledge that the issuer's tender offer would fail without a successful
merger with another entity. Unfortunately, the investor could not tie the
financial officer to any such statement, and the statements made by the
financial officer merely indicated a groping for cash from a variety of
sources. 125 Similarly, the officers' informing the board of the failure to
complete the acquisition, their proposal to reduce the tender-offer size,
and their efforts to convert payables into preferred stock failed to raise a
126
strong inference of scienter.
120. Id. at 639-41.
121. Id. at 642-43.
122. Id. at 644.
123. See Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 825 F.2d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 1987); SEC
v. Sw. Coal & Energy Co., 624 F.2d 1312, 1321 n.17 (5th Cir. 1980).
124. R2 Invs., 401 F.3d at 644.

125. The Fifth Circuit refuses to attribute corporate statements without attribution to
officers merely because of their position. See Southland Sec. Corp., 365 F.3d at 363.
126. R2 Invs., 401 F.3d at 645-47.
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In Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc. ,127 the Fifth Circuit faced an issuer that mislabeled transactions as normal commercial sales rather than agreements
on a trial basis. The investor contended that the issuer, which had decreasing revenues over several years, sought to attract new investment
through three press releases. The first two releases described the issuer's
granting of an exclusive dealership involving a commitment to purchase
$25 million annually of the issuer's product and a sale of $6.5 million to
the dealership. The release described one dealer as a leading international provider of telecommunications services and the other as one of
North America's fastest-growing application providers. Within four
months, the issuer sent its product and booked $700,000 in sales, as was
its custom. The auditors disputed the action due to their belief that the
dealership could not pay. The issuer accepted the auditors' advice and
withdrew the $700,000 from its revenue, yet the auditors resigned. The
issuer's release concerning the dealership's collapse failed to indicate that
one dealer had filed for bankruptcy three weeks earlier. The third press
release announced agreements with major big-name customers to ship
product within one month on a trial basis under which, if the customer
decided to keep the product, would lead to a sale after the trial period.
None of these agreements generated ongoing business for the issuer. An
investor brought a lawsuit for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5, controlling-person liability, and various Illinois state-law claims. 128 The district
court adopted the magistrate's reports that the court should dismiss the
actions for failure to meet the pleading standards of PSLRA, failure to
identify a factual basis making the press releases false or misleading, failure to adequately allege scienter, and the inactionability of the statements
under the safe-harbor rule for forward-looking statements due to the ac129
companiment of sufficient cautionary language.
The Fifth Circuit, however, did not agree with respect to the first two
press releases. Adopting a rule that later facts generally do not make
earlier statements misleading, 130 this case fit an exception. When a deal
collapses so quickly, one can infer something was amiss initially. The investor had alleged that one dealer had small revenues and the other related one had been incorporated only six months before the transaction.
One dealer declared bankruptcy within eight months of the transaction.
The auditors were so concerned within four months of the transaction
that they resigned, touting that the dealers created an impression that
substantial revenues would flow from the transaction. For these two
press releases, the Fifth Circuit also found a strong inference of scienter.
The issuer was at least reckless in not doing sufficient due diligence for a
transaction that would increase revenues thirty-fold to discover that the
dealers were incredibly small and newly incorporated. 1 31 Moreover, the
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

407 F.3d 690 (5th Cir. 2005) (from the Eastern District of Texas).
Id. at 693-95.
Id. at 695-96; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A) (1997).
Id. at 698 (quoting Lain v. Evans, 123 F. Supp. 2d 344, 350 (N.D. Tex. 2000)).
See id. at 700.
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issuer's annual report described the transaction as a testing agreement,
not the normal commercial sale described in the press releases, suggesting
a motive for the omission. The Fifth Circuit, however, did agree with the
district court with respect to the third press release. It expressly described the transactions as on a trial basis rather than a commercial
sale.132
2.

Proof of Reliance for Fraud on the Market under Rule 10b-5

The Fifth Circuit considered two class-action certifications involving
the "fraud on the market theory" and joined the Third, Fourth, and Ninth
Circuits in tightening the standard of proof necessary to justify class certification. The "fraud on the market theory" dispenses with the requirement to prove reliance for the implied fraud action under SEC Rule 10b5.133 The "fraud on the market theory" presumes that, in an open and
developed securities market, the information available in that market determines an issuer's stock price. Consequently, misstatements or omissions will defraud investors of that issuer's securities, even if the investors
did not directly rely on the misstatements or omissions.13 4 To support
this presumption, the investors must prove that the security at issue
trades in an efficient market. 135 In the absence of an efficient market, the
class fails, and each investor must prove reliance separately. Since the
issue of an efficient market becomes critical for class certification for investors in small-cap issuers, courts have required rigorous, though preliminary, standards of proof to the issue of an efficient market for small-cap
securities rather than merely presume facts in favor of the investors' petition. 136
In Unger v. Amedisys Inc.13 7 the Fifth Circuit faced issuer securities
traded on the Over the Counter Bulletin Board ("OTCBB"), an electronic service offered by the National Association of Securities Dealers
for real-time quotes for securities not listed or traded on any other national exchange, including the NASDAQ. The issuer, a company providing home health care and nursing services, allegedly manipulated the
132. Id. at 701.
133. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see also Stephenson v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis,
Inc., 839 F.2d 1095, 1098 (5th Cir. 1988) (the investor for the implied fraud action under
Rule 10b-5 must prove (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the perpetrator, (2)
scienter on the part of the perpetrator, (3) reliance by the investor, and (4) due diligence
by the investor in pursuing the investor's interest with care and good faith).
134. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988) (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806
F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
135. See id. at 248-49.
136. See Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 368-70 (4th Cir. 2004); Newton
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 167-69 (3d Cir. 2001); Binder
v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court's disallowance of
lower courts inquiring into the merits of a case to determine a class certification does not
bar the fact inquiry into an efficient market. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 177-78 (1974).
137. 401 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2005) (Judge Edith Jones, from the Middle District of Louisiana). Judge Jones served on the Texas Law Review with the author.
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federal Medicare Prospective Payment System to inflate estimated costs
for certain health services, artificially increasing earnings, and thereby enhancing the issuer's stock price. 138 In imposing a standard for the efficient-market issue, the Fifth Circuit refused to adopt a per se inefficient
rule for all over-the-counter securities and did not require expert testimony on the issue. 139 The Fifth Circuit, however, did compile an inexhaustive list of eight factors used in varying degrees by prior court
decisions on the issue. 140 The Fifth Circuit's advice lay in requiring that
use of the factors required an analytical weighting, not merely a counting,
since each of the factors represented a facet of market efficiency. 14 1 In
certifying that the class had failed in requiring the investors to conduct
this analytical weighting, the district court used the factors merely as a
checklist. 142 The district court considered only three factors: (1) the
stock's trading volume percentage, (2) market makers trading the stock,
and (3) a causal relationship between issuer events and price movement.
A finding of a trading volume of 3.9% based on internet printouts was
insufficient since some exchanges report exaggerated volume by doublecounting both sales and purchases, and the district court failed to verify
the figure. A finding of twenty-two market makers based on a single internet printout and affidavits admitted without an opportunity for crossexamination was inadequate since there was no link between that number
and trading volume. A finding of a causal relation between security price
and issuer press releases based on three time-points, a price rise following
a positive press release on two different days, and one price decline following a negative press release, was also error since three points are not
enough to establish the causal relationship. 143 Also, the evidence ignored
by the district court pointed to an inefficient market. There were no market analysts for the issuer to digest the public information for the investors. The issuer was unable to use the SEC's short form registration. 144
In Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc.145 the Fifth Circuit confronted issuer securities traded on the NASDAQ, the automatic quote system of
the NASD for the more actively traded over-the-counter market. The
issuer, a company that provided electronic order management and customer-service solutions to e-commerce and direct marketing firms allegedly made false and misleading statements with respect to its initial public
138. Id. at 319.
139. Id. at 323.
140. Id.

141. See id. at 325.
142. The eight factors were (1) the average weekly trading volume as a percentage of
total outstanding shares, (2) the number of security analysts following and reporting on the
issuer, (3) the extent to which market makers and arbitrageurs trade in the security, (4) the
company's eligibility to file short form registrations with the SEC on Form S-3, (5) empirical evidence of a causal relation between the issuer's significant press releases and immediate price response of its securities, (6) the issuer's market capitalization, (7) the bid-ask
spread for its securities, and (8) the securities' float excluding insider securities. Id. at 323.
143. Id. at 324-25.
144. Id. at 325.
145. 422 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2005) (from the Northern District of Texas).
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offering. 14 6 The Fifth Circuit refused to limit its new Unger decision to
the OTCBB securities. Even though NASDAQ securities are more heavily traded, small-cap issuers on NASDAQ must also satisfy the Unger burden to show market efficiency since many securities of relatively
unknown issuers trade them merely because they met the eligibility requirements.1 47 The district court correctly refused to certify the class
since the investors made the same mistakes that the Unger investors
did-failing to conduct the necessary analytical analysis with respect to
the relevant factors. The investors presented only three of the factors: (1)
trading volume, (2) the number of market makers and analysts, and (3) a
causal relationship between issuer events and price movement. The court
held that high trading volume fails to indicate an efficient market without
converting the number to the percentage of outstanding shares. Further,
seventeen market makers is inadequate without data relating to the volume of shares they are committed to trade and actually traded with the
prices. Finally, analyst coverage absent during a third of the purported
class period does not reveal an efficient market. Evidence contained in
the excluded expert's report also revealed an absence of a difference between stock-price movement on information days and stock-price movethere was no error in the
ment on non-information days. Consequently,
148
district court's refusal to certify the class.

146. Id. at 309-10.
147. Id. at 312-13.
148. Id. at 315-16.
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